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Abstract 
We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of institutional structure 
in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets.  In a setting 
employing double auctions and call markets as trading institutions, bubbles and crashes 
are a quite robust phenomenon. The only factor appearing to reduce bubbles is experience 
across markets.  In this study, we employ the tâtonnement trading institution, which has 
not been previously explored in laboratory asset markets, despite its historical and 
contemporary relevance. The results show that bubbles are significantly reduced, 
suggesting that the trading institution plays a crucial role in the formation of bubbles.  
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1. Introduction 
Price bubbles are not a rare phenomenon. Indeed, there are many historical 
examples of commodity or financial asset markets that have experienced a period of 
sharp rising prices followed by an abrupt crash.  One of the earliest recorded and most 
famous examples is the Tulip mania (Holland, 1637) in which prices reached a peak of 
over ten times greater than a skilled craftsman’s annual income and then suddenly 
crashed to a fraction of its value.  More recently, the real estate bubble of 2007 plagued 
many of the major economies of the world from which most are still reeling today 
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2009).   
As price bubbles represent a phenomenon with substantive economic 
implications, they are widely studied in finance and economics.  Smith, Suchanek, and 
Williams (1988) were the first to observe price bubbles in long-lived finite horizon 
experimental asset markets.  Many studies have followed the pioneering work of Smith et 
al. in order to test the robustness of the price bubble phenomenon.  To date, the only 
treatment variable that appears to consistently eliminate the existence of price bubbles is 
experience of all or some of the markets participants via participation in previous asset 
market sessions with identical environments (Smith et al., 1988; Van Boening, Williams, 
and LaMaster, 1993; Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore, 2005; Haruvy, Lahav, and 
Noussair, 2007).
1
   
                                                 
1
 Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008) show that if the environment is subject to changes in liquidity and 
uncertainty, then even experience is not sufficient to eliminate bubbles.  Noussair and Tucker (2006) seem 
to eliminate the spot market bubble via a stylized experimental design of a futures market for every spot 
market period.  Crockett and Duffy (2009) show that intertemporal consumption smoothing inhibits the 
formation of bubbles.  
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Asset market experience addresses what we believe to be two leading 
explanations for the existence of price bubbles.  The first is the lack of common 
expectations due to the rationality of subjects not being common knowledge (Smith et al., 
1988; Smith, 1994).  Even though the experimenter can make every effort to explain the 
dividend process to all subjects, they may still be skeptical about the rationality of other 
traders.  That is, some subjects may believe that other traders may be willing to make a 
purchase at a price greater than the fundamental value, and thus provide opportunities for 
capital gains via speculation.  This speculative demand can build upon itself, and thus 
endogenously push the prices higher and higher above the fundamental value creating a 
price bubble.  Note that with the lack of common knowledge of rationality, speculative 
bubbles may exist even if all subjects understand the dividend process perfectly.  The 
second explanation, as argued by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2002) and Lei and Vesely 
(2009), is that the difficulty in assessing the dynamic asset valuation may generate 
confusion and decision errors leading to bubble formation.  More specifically, subjects 
may struggle with backward induction in order to correctly calculate the fundamental 
value, and thus a rational price, in a given period.  Accumulating experience by 
participating in multiple asset markets allows subjects to gain confidence in the 
rationality of other traders as well as to learn the dynamic asset valuation process, and 
thus eliminate confusion and decision errors.  
The main innovation of our paper is that we consider a tâtonnement trading 
institution, as opposed to double auctions or call markets, typically used in experimental 
asset markets. We are interested in the tâtonnement trading institution for two reasons.  
Firstly, we believe that the tâtonnement addresses both of the driving forces for bubble 
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formation described above, and thus conjecture that price bubbles will be significantly 
reduced by the implementation of a tâtonnement trading institution instead of the 
standard call market or double auction institutions.  Furthermore, tâtonnement is a trading 
institution of historical and contemporary relevance.  Indeed, the tâtonnement is one of 
the earliest classical theories which is explicit about market price dynamics and 
adjustment to equilibrium (see Duffie and Sonnenschein, 1989). Also, the tâtonnement 
trading institution is not just an abstract theoretical construct as it is employed in some 
actual markets, e.g., the Tokyo grain exchange (Eaves and Williams, 2007).      
A characteristic of the double auction market mechanism is that buyers and sellers 
tender bids/asks publicly.  Typically the highest bid to buy and the lowest ask to sell are 
displayed and open to acceptance, and price quotes progress to reduce the bid\ask spread.  
Trading is open for a limited period of time and occurs bilaterally and sequentially at 
different prices within a period.  In the call market, on the other hand, bids and asks are 
accumulated and the maximum possible number of transactions are simultaneously 
cleared at a single price per period.   
How does the tâtonnement differ from these institutions?  In our implementation 
of tâtonnement institution, the initial price is selected randomly in every period. Subjects 
submit quantities to buy or sell at the given price.  If aggregate demand is equal to 
aggregate supply, the market clears. Otherwise, the market proceeds with price 
adjustment iterations.  More specifically, the provisional price moves upward if there is 
excess demand and downward if there is excess supply (the actual workings of the price 
adjustment mechanism are explained in Section 3).  Subjects submit their desired 
quantity to buy or sell at the new provisional price, and the process continues until the 
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market clears.
2
  Thus, there may be several non-binding iterations within each period that 
are publicly observable and reflect the formation of aggregate demand, aggregate supply, 
and equilibrium price.   
We believe that these non-binding price adjustment iterations in each period take 
into account both leading conjectures of bubble formation that are addressed by 
experience, and thus the tâtonnement market institution may significantly reduce price 
bubbles even with inexperienced subjects.  That is, the tâtonnement market institution 
may allow subjects to learn from each other in each period thereby establishing common 
expectations and reducing decision errors and confusion.  Indeed, subjects now have the 
ability to learn demand, supply, and equilibrium price without actual trading.  This is in 
contrast with the double auction institution where trades occur in continuous time, and 
thus extreme behavior associated with confusion or decision errors may more easily 
influence the market into a price bubble scenario.
3
  In other words, in order for trade to 
occur under the tâtonnement market institution, subjects need to come to a collective 
agreement (as market clears only if excess demand/supply is equal to zero) while in 
double auctions or call markets that is not the case.
4
  Under tâtonnement, the sequence of 
non-binding price adjustment within a period itself reveals information, allowing subjects 
to have a more accurate belief about equilibrium, and gain experience within a period 
                                                 
2
 Note that the price adjustment process could result in an infinite number of oscillations. If the price 
changed by only one franc and remained in a region of three francs for four periods in a row, then the 
period was concluded manually (see Section 3 for more details). 
3
 In a sense, the tâtonnement price adjustment process protects the market from extreme bids that 
(particularly in early periods) may lead to speculative bubbles under a double auction institution.  
4
 Under the tâtonnement trading institution, the magnitude of excess supply/excess demand within the price 
adjustment process signals to subjects the general consensus regarding the equilibrium price and where 
their decision lies in relation to that consensus. Informally, suppose that the total number of shares is 120 
units.  If the excess supply is only 5 shares and I am a buyer, I should not be that concerned about doing 
something wrong. However, if excess supply is 100, and I am trying to buy, I might start thinking about 
why the vast majority of subjects have very different beliefs about the equilibrium price than me.  
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rather than across periods as is the case under other trading institutions.  Thus, there is a 
strong learning tool for inexperienced subjects embodied in the trading institution. 
We find that under the tâtonnement trading institution, price bubbles are indeed 
mitigated according to all bubble measures employed in the literature.
5
  Furthermore, the 
performance of the tâtonnement in relation to these bubble measures is similar to those 
reported in double auctions and call markets from previous studies with once and twice 
experienced subjects (King et al., 1993), which have been the gold standard in the 
literature for eliminating price bubbles.  This result is especially surprising when you take 
into account that it occurred in an environment that is very supportive to bubble creation, 
i.e., our experimental design has a much greater initial cash/asset ratio than most of the 
comparable studies (Caginalp et al., 1998).    
Section 2 provides a short literature review of related studies, and Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedures. We discuss the results in Section 4 and 
conclude with Section 5. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The existence of price bubbles is one of the most interesting and robust results 
from the multi-period asset market studies in the experimental literature.  Smith et al. 
(1988) were the first to observe price bubbles in long-lived finite horizon asset markets.  
Their design implements a continuous double auction market trading institution with a 
finite time horizon of 15 trading periods.  It is common knowledge that (1) each unit of 
the asset pays a dividend to its holder at the end of each period, (2) the dividend value is 
                                                 
5
 In order to compare different treatments, we modified existing measures to take into account different 
dividend processes, experiment duration etc. (See also Section 3.) 
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drawn each period from an independent equi-probable 4-point distribution, and (3) assets 
are worthless after the final dividend draw in the terminal period.  Therefore, subjects are 
able to calculate the fundamental value of the asset at any time during the experiment.  
The time series of the fundamental value declines over time, i.e., the fundamental value 
decreases each period by the value of the expected dividend payment. Smith et al. find 
that, with inexperienced subjects, the typical time series of prices in these markets 
exhibits a bubble and crash pattern.  That is, prices initially start below the fundamental 
value and then climb over time to prices that are significantly greater than the 
fundamental accompanied by excess market activity, and ending with a crash in the last 
periods of the experiment to the fundamental value.   
In the last twenty plus years, numerous studies have followed the seminal work of 
Smith et al. to try to explain the bubble phenomenon and test mechanisms that may 
mitigate their existence.  Interestingly, only few studies have analyzed the effect of the 
trading institution.  The majority of studies have employed the continuous double auction 
market trading institution in replication of the original study of Smith et al.  The only 
other trading institution employed, that we know of, is the uniform-price sealed-bid-offer 
call market.  
Van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993) were the first to implement the call 
market as a trading institution and the only to test it as a treatment variable against the 
double auction one.  Their motivation was that the limited bid/ask information within a 
call market would reduce the triggers of speculative trading, and thus eliminate price 
bubbles.  They conducted two series of sessions under each institution in order to collect 
data at three levels of experience.  Each series consisted of the exact same cohort of 
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subjects and the sessions were conducted on different days.  They find that call markets 
do not eliminate price bubbles and in fact provide very similar asset price patterns and 
bubble measures as the double auction.
6
 
Since the call market had been shown to produce similar price patterns as the 
double auction, it has been used as trading institution in other studies (e.g., Caginalp, 
Porter, and Smith, 2000; Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair, 2007; Hussam, Porter, and Smith, 
2008) to test other treatment variables in order to take advantage of some call market 
characteristics.  The results of these studies supported Van Boening et al. (1993). 
 As stated previously, subject experience is the only factor shown to consistently 
eliminate price bubbles.  Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) conducted a study 
with a mixture of experienced and inexperienced traders in order to find evidence for a 
lower bound of the proportion of experienced traders required to eliminate bubbles.  They 
ran a series of four consecutive asset markets employing a continuous double auction 
trading institution.  In the fourth iteration, a fraction of the experienced subjects were 
replaced with inexperienced subjects.  They find that with as few as 1/3 of traders being 
experienced on average there were no significant differences from when all traders were 
experienced.  An interesting aspect of their data that is particularly relevant to our 
motivation for the tâtonnement institution is that in every instance the experienced traders 
“led” the market.  That is, experienced traders were always the first to enter the market 
and in only a single instance was an inexperienced trader the second trader to enter.  
Therefore, one interpretation is that the inexperienced traders were able to learn from the 
experienced traders, i.e., acquire the knowledge that the experienced traders gained over 
                                                 
6
 Tables 1 and 2 within the Results section provide a comparison of experimental designs and bubble 
measures across studies. 
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the three previous markets, and thus averting a price bubble that is typically observed 
when all subjects are inexperienced.  The tâtonnement institution allows for a group of all 
(initially) inexperienced traders to learn from each other within each period of trading. 
The main contribution of our study is to show that trading institutions matter for the 
formation of bubbles and that bubbles are eliminated under the tâtonnement, a trading 
institution which has not been previously studied in the experimental literature on asset 
markets. Furthermore, our study also provides a meta-analysis of several existing studies, 
which is interesting in its own. 
 
3. The Experiment 
The experiment consisted of four sessions conducted between September and 
October 2004 and one session conducted in May 2009 in the New Zealand Experimental 
Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New 
Zealand.  Twelve traders for each session were recruited from undergraduate courses 
throughout the university.  Some of the subjects had participated in previous experiments, 
but none had experience with asset markets.  Each subject only took part in a single 
session of the study.  The experiment was computerized and used the z-Tree software 
package.
7
  Trade was denominated in "francs" which were converted to New Zealand 
dollars at the end of the experiment at the predetermined publicly known conversion rate 
of 600 francs to 1 NZD.  On average, sessions lasted approximately 2.5 hours including 
                                                 
7
 See Fischbacher (1999) for a discussion of the z-Tree software package. 
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initial instructional period and payment of subjects.  Subjects earned 26.80 NZD on 
average.
8
 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were endowed with 10 units of the 
asset and a cash balance of 10,000 francs.  The asset had a finite life of 15 periods.  At 
the end of each trading period, each unit of the asset in a subject’s inventory paid an 
uncertain dividend that was equally likely to be 0, 8, 28, or 60 francs (e.g., Smith et 
al.,1988; King et al., 1993; Caginalp et al., 2000; Lei et al., 2001; Haruvy and Noussair, 
2006; Noussair and Tucker, 2006; Hussam et al., 2008).  Therefore, the average dividend 
paid per unit of the asset held in each period equaled 24 francs.  The dividend was 
independently drawn each period.  After the final dividend payment in period 15, the 
asset was worthless.  Therefore, the fundamental value of the asset at any given time 
during the market equaled 24 francs times the number of periods remaining.   
Table 1 compares our design to several other treatments available in the literature 
such as Smith et al. (1988), Van Boeing et al. (1993), Lei at al. (2001), Dufwenberg et al. 
(2005), and Haruvy et al. (2008).  We categorize the data into seven groups, based on the 
trading institution and experience level.
9
  For instance, group 1 consists of the data 
collected under our experiment, which employs non-experienced subjects and a 
tâtonnement trading institution, as indicated in the first four columns of the table. Other 
columns provide information regarding the number of sessions and important features of 
the experimental design. 
                                                 
8
 At the time of the experiment, the adult minimum wage in New Zealand was 9.00 NZD per hour (1 NZD 
= 0.6708 USD). 
9
 We will make reference to these groupings of experiments as indicated by column 1 throughout the rest of 
the text. 
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The last column of Table 1 provides the cash per asset (CPA) ratio as defined by 
Caginalp et al. (1998), i.e.,  q S D S   where S is the initial total value of assets and 
D is the initial total amount of cash.  Caginalp et al. showed that the greater the initial 
total value of cash relative to initial total value of assets in a market the greater will be 
average period transaction prices and thus the higher will be the probability of a bubble.  
As indicated by the CPA ratio calculations, our design is the second most cash rich of all 
the listed studies with 1.78q  .  In other words, in our design, cash holdings exceed the 
value of the assets, priced at the highest fundamental value, by 178%.  With the exception 
of Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001), this is in sharp contrast with other designs, where cash 
holdings are lower (as indicated by positive q) than the value of the assets. Therefore, our 
experimental design provides an environment that favors price bubble formation. 
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Table 1. Experiments Varying by Trading Institutions and Experience 
 
G
ro
u
p
 
Trading 
Institution 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
Paper 
Other Design Features 
Number of Initial (average)  
Expected  
Dividend 
CPA 
Ratio Sessions Periods Subjects 
Working 
Capital per 
Trader 
Asset 
Endowment 
per Trader 
1 Tâtonnement n LPT (2009) 5 15 12 10,000 10 24 -1.78 
2a 
Double 
Auction 
n 
LNP (2001) 
LNP (2001) 
LNP (2001) 
1 
2 
1 
15 
12 
12 
7 
7 
7 
100,000 
100,000 
10,000 
10 
10 
10 
24 
30 
30 
-26.78 
-26.78 
-1.78 
2b 
Double 
Auction 
n 
SSW (1988) 
VWL (1993) 
VWL (1993) 
DLM (2005) 
1 
1 
1 
10 
15 
15 
15 
10 
12 
15 
14 
6 
6.80 
7.20 
7.20 
4.00 
2.33 
2 
2 
4 
0.16 
0.25 
0.25 
0.10 
-0.22 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
3 
Call 
Market 
n 
VWL (1993) 
VWL (1993) 
HLN (2007) 
1 
1 
6 
15 
15 
15 
15 
12 
9 
7.20 
7.20 
292 
2 
2 
2 
0.25 
0.25 
12 
0.04 
0.04 
0.19 
4 
Double 
Auction 
x 
SSW (1988) 
VWL (1993) 
VWL (1993) 
DLM (2005) 
1 
1 
1 
10 
15 
15 
15 
10 
9 
15 
14 
6 
5.85 
7.20 
7.20 
4.00 
2 
2 
2 
4 
0.24 
0.25 
0.25 
0.10 
0.19 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
5 
Call 
Market 
x VWL (1993) 
1 
1 
15 
15 
15 
12 
7.20 
7.20 
2 
2 
0.25 0.04 
6 
Double 
Auction 
xx 
SSW (1988) 
VWL (1993) 
VWL (1993) 
DLM (2005) 
1 
1 
1 
10 
15 
15 
15 
10 
9 
15 
14 
6 
5.85 
7.20 
7.20 
4.00 
2 
2 
2 
4 
0.24 
0.25 
0.25 
0.10 
0.19 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
7 
Call 
Market 
xx VWL (1993) 
1 
1 
15 
15 
15 
12 
7.20 
7.20 
2 
2 
0.25 
0.04 
0.04 
1. Experience: n = no experience; x = once experienced; xx = twice-experienced. 2. Paper: LPT = 
Lugovskyy, Puzzello, and Tucker; LNP= Lei, Noussair and Plott; SSW = Smith, Suchanek, and Williams; 
VWL = Van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster; DLM = Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore; HLN = 
Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair 
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Subjects were provided an “Average Holding Value Sheet” within their 
instructions packet that illustrated the value of the stream of dividend payments from a 
given period to the end of the experiment.
10
  Although the dividend process was 
explained in detail within the instructions, there was no suggestion of a relationship 
between the dividend process and prices at which one should be willing to make 
transactions. 
The trading institution employed in all markets was the tâtonnement.  In each 
period, subjects were allowed either to buy or to sell units of X as long as they had 
sufficient cash on hand to cover the purchase or sufficient inventory of assets to make the 
sale.  The specifics of the tâtonnement trading institution used within our experiment are 
as follows.  At the beginning of each period, the computer announced a randomly drawn 
initial price from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 500].
11
  Each subject decided 
how many units of X that they wanted to buy or sell at this given price by placing bids or 
asks respectively. The computer aggregated individual decisions and compared the 
market quantity demanded (QD) to the market quantity supplied (QS).  If the market 
cleared (QD = QS), then the process stopped and transactions were completed.  If the 
market did not clear at the initial random price, then the price would adjust in the 
appropriate direction.
12
 Specifically, we employed a “proportional” adjustment rule, 
which can be thought of as proceeding in two stages (see also Joyce, 1984, 1998).  
In the first stage, the price adjusts proportionally according to the following rule: 
 1 , 1 , 1t t t D t S tP P Q Q     , where  10,5,2.5,1,0.5,0.25,0.05t   is the adjustment 
                                                 
10
 A copy of the instructions is provided in the Appendix. 
11
 The maximum fundamental value in period 1 was equal to 360 francs.   
12
 The price is adjusted upward in case of excess demand and downward in case of excess supply. 
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factor and subscript t is the iteration of adjustment.  The initial adjustment factor is 10 
and decreases to the next lower value unless we observe either an excess supply or an 
excess demand twice in a row, i.e., unless  , ,D t S tQ Q  is of the same sign as 
 , 1 , 1D t S tQ Q  .
13
  For small levels of excess supply/demand (or in the second stage), the 
price adjustment rule is replaced by 
1 1t tP P   if  , 1 , 10 1t D t S tQ Q     , and by  
1 1t tP P   if  , 1 , 11 0t D t S tQ Q      . 
(53,9)
(6,55)
(10,30)
(32,22)
(23,24) (26,21) (21,23) (15,15)
1
8
8
3
0
9
3
6
0
6
2
8
P
ri
c
e
1 2 4 6 8
Iteration
 
Figure 1. Pricing rule iterations in period 1 of Session 1 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the price adjustment rule works via the data collected in 
period 1 of session 1. At the initial price of P1=188, aggregate demand is QD,1=53 and 
aggregate supply is QS,1=9. In the next iteration, the price is P2=188+10(53-9)=628. At 
P2=628, aggregate demand is QD,2=6 and aggregate supply is QS,2=55, which implies that 
                                                 
13
 In general, as the number of iterations increases, it takes a larger gap between aggregate quantity 
demanded and supplied to significantly adjust the price. 
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the adjustment factor used in the iteration will be 5, so that P3=383. The same process 
continues for all other prices in the iteration sequence of the period. Subjects had access 
to flow information so they could see the aggregate demand and supply of stocks in every 
iteration of every period. 
 We did not implement an “improvement rule.”14 That is, following each price 
announcement, players were free to submit new bids and asks, without any constraints on 
their behavior from prior iterations.  As a result, it is possible that the price adjustment 
process may result in an infinite number of oscillations around a narrow region of prices.  
For any given announced price, participants could choose any amount to buy or sell 
irrespective of their decisions in the previous adjustment iteration (there is no 
improvement rule). In order to avoid the oscillating prices, we employed a manual 
closing rule if D SQ Q  within several iterations.  More specifically, if according to the 
price adjustment mechanism, the price changed by only one franc and remained in a 
region of three francs for four periods in a row, then the period was concluded 
manually.
15
  The process for manual conclusion of a period was as follows.  An 
announcement was made by the experimenter that a manual conclusion was to be 
conducted and the subjects were not to enter an amount to buy or sell into the computer 
for the current iteration announced price.  On Bidding Sheets provided to them within the 
instructions, subjects had to write the announced price given by the computer for this 
iteration and the amount of X that they wanted to buy or sell at this price.  The 
experimenter then collected these sheets and totaled the amount of X that people wanted 
                                                 
14
 This is consistent with the Tâtonnement institution employed in the Tokyo Grain Exchange. 
15
 Examples of the criteria for implementing the manual closing rule is if the price went from 100, to 101, 
back to 100, then back to 101, or if the price went from 100, to 101, to 102, then back to 101. 
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to buy and sell.  If D SQ Q , then the transactions were made according to the bids/asks 
made.  If D SQ Q , then the units sold were randomly allocated to the buyers.  If 
,D SQ Q  then the units bought were randomly divided among the sellers. Once the 
allocation was determined for the period, the experimenter redistributed the Bidding 
Sheets back to the subjects who then entered the amount assigned to them to buy/sell into 
the computer, which concluded the period. 
 
4. Results 
We compare our results to several other treatments available in the literature such 
as Smith et al. (1988), Van Boeing et al. (1993), Lei at al. (2001), Dufwenberg et al. 
(2005), and Haruvy et al. (2008).  We categorize the data into seven groups, based on the 
trading institution and experience level.  The description of groups and corresponding 
experiments is provided in Table 1. 
We start by comparing the observed price deviations from fundamental values 
across experiments. For this purpose, we normalize the fundamental values and prices 
across studies so that the first period fundamental value in all experiments is rescaled to 
100.  That is, in period t, the normalized fundamental value and normalized price are 
defined as 
100
1
100
t tf f
f
   and 100
1
100
t tP P
f
 . 
For example, in our experiment, the fundamental value is 360 in period 1 and 240 in 
period 6.  The normalized fundamental values are 100 and 240*100/360=67, respectively.  
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Figure 2 depicts the time series of normalized prices and fundamentals in our 
experiment.
16
  Each period of the experiment is provided on the horizontal axis and 
(normalized) market clearing prices are indicated on the vertical axis.  According to 
Figure 2, the prices in Sessions 1, 2, and 5 remain close to the fundamental value, while 
the prices in Sessions 3 and 4 display departures from the fundamental value. 
 
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
4
0
P
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c
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
Fundamental
Average Price
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4
Session 5
 
Figure 2. Normalized Prices and Fundamental in Tâtonnement, Inexperienced 
 
If judged only by Figure 2, it appears the tâtonnement trading institution only 
partially succeeds in attenuating bubbles, since in two out of five sessions we observe 
price deviations from the fundamental value typical of a bubble.  However, a careful 
evaluation of bubble size, as pointed out by the definition of a bubble itself, should 
                                                 
16
 Corresponding quantities and numbers of iterations per period are provided in Appendix A.  
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involve two dimensions, i.e., transaction prices and quantities.
17
  As we will show, once 
both factors are taken into account, the tâtonnement trading institution appears to have 
quite a strong dampening effect on the bubble phenomenon. In particular, the trade 
volumes in each of our sessions are much lower than the corresponding quantities in the 
previous experiments.
18
  Before substantiating this claim (see also Table 2), let us have a 
look at normalized prices under other trading institutions.  
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Figure 3a.  Average Normalized Price (10 Periods). 
                                                 
17
 A bubble is “trade in high volumes at prices that are considerably at variance with intrinsic values (italics 
ours)” (see King et al., 1993). 
18
 The typical price adjustment process presented in Figure 1 shows that the tâtonnement trading institution 
does not result in lower turnover values simply due to the nature of the institution reducing bidding activity.  
For announced prices sharply different than the fundamental values, most of the periods show extreme 
excess supply or demand, i.e., all participants on one side of the market.  Therefore just as theory predicts, 
the market exhibits large amounts of activity when prices deviate sharply from fundamental values and low 
activity for prices close to fundamental values. 
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Figure 3b.  Average Normalized Price (12 Periods). 
 
Figures 3a and 3b depict average normalized prices across groups identified in 
Table 1 for experiments with duration of 10 and 12 periods, respectively. Clearly, they 
indicate that experience plays a key role in the formation of bubbles as average prices are 
closer to fundamental value the higher is the experience level of subjects.  
Furthermore, Figure 4 also compares average normalized prices, collected under 
tâtonnement, with average normalized prices collected under double auctions in 
experiments with 15 periods.
19
  Similarly, Figure 5 compares our data, collected under 
tâtonnement with the data collected under call markets consisting of 15 periods. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 We do not include this comparison in Figure 4 because the design of Dufwenberg et al. (2005) consists of 
10 periods. 
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Figure 4.  Average Normalized Price (15 Periods): Tâtonnement vs. Double Auction 
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Figure 5.  Average Normalized Price (15 Periods): Tâtonnement vs. Call Market 
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Figures 4 and 5 clearly indicate that the price patterns of the tâtonnement are 
remarkably closer to the fundamental value than those of the call market and double 
auction non-experienced sessions.  What’s more, the price patterns of the tâtonnement are 
also comparable with those of experienced and double-experienced subjects of both the 
double auction and call market institutions, which are typically acknowledged as a no-
bubble environment.   
To confirm the impression that the tâtonnement trading institution has an 
attenuating effect on asset price bubbles, we employ measures of bubbles’ magnitude 
used in laboratory markets by King et al. (1993), Van Boening et al. (1993), Porter and 
Smith (1995), and Dufwenberg et al. (2005). However, in order to compare measures 
across different studies (e.g., with different duration and dividend process), we perform 
appropriate modifications. In particular, we normalize the turnover by the number of 
periods, and the normalized absolute price deviation by the number of periods and the 
first period fundamental value. The definition of these measures is provided below.  
 The Haessel-R2 (W. Haessel, 1978) measures goodness-of-fit between observed 
(mean prices) and fundamental values. It is appropriate, since the fundamental 
values are exogenously given. The Haessel-R
2
 tends to 100% as trading prices 
tend to fundamental values. 
 The Normalized Price Amplitude is defined as the difference between the peak and 
the trough of the period price relative to the fundamental value,
20
 normalized by the 
initial fundamental value, f1 (in our markets f1 = 360). In other words, price 
amplitude equals    
1
100%
* max mint t t t t tA P f P f
f
      , where tP  is the 
                                                 
20
 In the double auction case, mean period prices are used as trades occur at different prices within a period. 
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market clearing price
21
 and
tf  is the fundamental value in period t.  A high Price 
Amplitude suggests large price swings relative to fundamental value, and is 
evidence that prices have departed from fundamental values.   
 The Normalized Absolute Price Deviation is defined as the sum, over all 
transactions, of the absolute deviations of prices from the fundamental value, 
divided by the Total Number of Shares outstanding: 
 11100%* * *
T
t t tt
D n P f f TSU T

  , where tn  is the number of units traded 
in period t, TSU is the total stock of units, and T is the time horizon length.
22
  A 
high Normalized Absolute Deviation corresponds to a high volume of trading 
activity at prices deviating from fundamental values.   
 The Normalized Turnover is defined as the total number of transactions over the 
life of the asset divided by the total stock of units:    100%* *ttTR n T TSU  , 
TSU is the total stock of units and T is the time horizon length.  A high Turnover 
indicates a high volume of trade, suggesting heterogeneous expectations or decision 
errors prompting trade. 
In Table 2, the impression that bubbles are substantially reduced under tâtonnement 
is confirmed by statistical analysis. That is, our study demonstrates that a way to impede 
bubble formation is to use a tâtonnement (TT) trading institution instead of double 
auction (DA) or call markets (CM).    
 
 
                                                 
21
 In the double auction, Pt denotes the average transaction price. 
22
 Note, that the corresponding measure under the double auction trading institution is 
 1* * ,it ti tD P f T f TSU   where Pit is the individual price in transaction i of period t. 
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Table 2. Bubble Measures by Trading Institution and Experience. 
Group 
(as labeled in Table 1) 
N of 
Sessions 
Average Bubble Measures 
Haessel R
2
, 
% 
Normalized Absolute 
Price Deviation, % 
Normalized 
Price 
Amplitude, % 
Normalized
Turnover, 
% 
G1  TT, n 5 84.5 1.7 45.0 8.7 
G2a  DA, n 4 33.4 36.3 220.5 45.4 
G2b  DA, n 13 36.0 15.4 85.4 52.0 
G3  CM, n 8 29.6 8.1 189.6 15.5 
G4 DA, x 13 49.6 13.8 80.1 40.9 
G5 CM, x 2 60.2 1.7 118.3 10.0 
G6 DA, xx 13 69.6 6.4 55.1 32.2 
G7 CM, xx 2 88.1 0.6 48.1 12.3 
z-Value G1=G2a 2.21** -2.45** -1.96** -2.46** 
z-Value G1=G2b 2.22** -3.12*** -2.02** -3.21*** 
z-Value G1=G3 2.34** -2.93*** -2.93*** -2.64*** 
z-Value G1=G4 2.02** -3.02*** -2.22** -3.21*** 
z-Value G1=G5 1.55 -0.39 -1.94* -0.39 
z-Value G1=G6 0.84 -2.32** -0.84 -3.01*** 
z-Value G1=G7 0.00 0.78 0.00 -1.78* 
*10% significance level; ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level. 
 
Specifically, Table 2 presents the relevant average bubble measures across sessions 
by trading institution and experience level. It also reports the results of Mann-Whitney 
nonparametric tests where the corresponding bubble measure for each session serves as 
one unit of observation.  These statistics clearly indicate that bubble measures are 
significantly smaller under tâtonnement than under any other trading institution reported 
in previous studies where subjects had no experience.  Furthermore, the bubble measures 
obtained in our sessions are comparable and in many cases even dominate the magnitudes 
obtained in experiments with experienced and twice-experienced subjects.  This finding 
is important because experiments with twice-experienced subjects are typically used as a 
non-bubble benchmark in the literature.  Thus, bubbles are greatly reduced under the 
tâtonnement trading institution.  These results are particularly strong since our design is 
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much more conducive to bubble formation than most of existing studies given our 
relatively cash rich initial endowments (see also the CPA data in Table 1).   
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of a tâtonnement trading institution on 
bubble formation in experimental asset markets. As suggested by several studies, bubbles 
appear to be extremely robust to changes in the experimental environment.  The only 
factor that appears to reduce bubbles is experience. Our study suggests that trading 
institutions matter and contribute to magnify or dampen the formation of bubbles. In 
particular, we find that tâtonnement, as opposed to double auctions and call markets, 
appears to facilitate learning about the equilibrium price or fundamental values of an 
asset. Furthermore, tâtonnement plays a key role in the elimination/reduction of bubbles 
in experimental settings.   
In view of the recent financial crisis, institutional re-design of field financial 
markets is an important topic. This paper suggests that experiments will be a useful part 
of the debate. In regards to this, a design of a tâtonnement trading institution to be 
employed in the field (e.g., closer to the one employed in the Tokyo Grain Exchange) is 
left for further research. 
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Appendix A. Quantity and Number of Iterations per Period in Tâtonnement, Inexperienced 
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Appendix B 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making.  The instructions are 
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a 
considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment.  The experiment will consist of fifteen trading periods in which you will have 
the opportunity to buy and sell in a market.  The currency used in the market is francs.  
All trading and earnings will be in terms of francs.   
 
________ francs = 1 NZ dollar 
 
Your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars when 
you leave the lab today.  The more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn.   
 
In each period, you may buy and sell units of a good called X in a market.  X can be 
considered an asset with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of X carries over from 
one trading period to the next.  Each unit of X in your inventory at the end of each 
trading period pays a dividend to you. The dividend paid on each unit is the same for 
every participant. 
 
You will not know the exact value of the dividend per unit until the end of each trading 
period. The dividend is determined by chance at the end of each period by a random 
number generator.  The dividend in each period has an equally likely chance of being 0, 
8, 28, or 60. The information is provided in the table below.   
 
Dividend → 0 8 28 60 
Likelihood → 25% 25% 25% 25% 
 
The average dividend per period for each unit of X is 24 francs. 
 
The dividend draws in each period are independent. That means that the likelihood of a 
particular dividend in a period is not affected by the dividend in previous periods.  
  
2. Your Earnings 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given 10,000 francs in your Cash 
inventory.  Your earnings for the entire experiment are equal to your Cash inventory at 
the end of period 15.  
 
All dividends you receive are added to your Cash inventory.  
 
All money spent on purchases is subtracted from your Cash inventory. 
 
All money received from sales is added to your Cash inventory. 
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Example of earnings from dividends: if you have 6 units of X at the end of period 3 and 
the dividend draw is 8 francs (which has a 25% chance of occurring), then your dividend 
earnings for period 3 are equal to 6 units x 8 francs = 48 francs.  
 
3.  Average Value Holding Table 
 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE (attached at the end of this 
document) to help you make decisions.  It calculates the average amount of dividends 
you will receive if you keep a unit of X until the end of the experiment.  It also describes 
how to calculate how much in future dividends you give up on average when you sell a 
share at any time.  The following describes each of the columns in the table. 
 
1. Ending Period: period 15 is the last trading period within the experiment, and thus the 
last period for which to receive a dividend payment.  After the final dividend payment in 
period 15, each unit of X is worthless. 
 
2. Current Period: the period during which the average holding value is being calculated.  
For example, in period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to “Current Period 1” are 
in effect. 
 
3. Number of Remaining Dividend Payments: the number of times that a dividend can be 
received from the current period until the final period (period 15).  That is, it indicates the 
number of random asset payment draws remaining in the lifetime of the asset.  It is 
calculated by taking the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current period 
number, and adding 1, because the dividend is also paid in the current period. 
 
4. Average Dividend Value per Period: the average amount of each dividend.  As we 
indicated earlier, the average dividend in each period is 24 francs per unit of X. 
 
5. Average Holding Value per Unit of Inventory: the average value of holding a unit of X 
for the remainder of the experiment.  That is, for each unit of X you hold in your 
inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you receive on average the amount listed 
in column 5.  The number in Average Holding Value is calculated by multiplying the 
Number of Remaining Dividend Payments with the Average Dividend Payment per 
Period. 
 
Please have a look at the table now and make sure you understand it.  The following 
example may help in your understanding. 
 
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining.  Since the dividend paid on a 
unit of X has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 
28, and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period 
for each unit of X.  If you hold a unit of X for 7 periods, the total dividend paid on the 
unit over the 7 periods is on average 7*24 = 168. 
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4.  Market and Trading Rules 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will have an initial inventory of 10 units of X 
and 10,000 francs.  The experiment will consist of 15 periods.  In each period, each 
participant will have an opportunity to place offers to sell OR buy units of X. At the 
beginning of the period, the computer will announce a randomly drawn initial price (from 
the uniform distribution on the interval [0,500]).  To place an offer to buy (sell) units of 
X at this announced price level, enter how many units of X you would like to buy (sell) at 
this announced price level and select the buy (sell) button on your screen.  Your offer to 
sell is limited by your Inventory of X, and your offer to buy cannot exceed 10 units.  The 
computer totals all the offers to buy and all the offers to sell.  An example of the bidding 
screen is provided below. 
 
 
 
If the total number of units that participants offer to buy is greater than the total number 
of units that participants offer to sell, then the program increases the announced price 
level and each participant may then make offers to buy or sell at this higher price level.  
 
If the total number of units that participants offer to buy is less than the total number of 
units that participants offer to sell, then the program decreases the announced price level 
and each participant may then make offers to buy or sell at this lower price level. 
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In both cases, the price adjustment made by the program is proportional to the difference 
between the total number of units participants offer to buy and the total number of units 
that participants offer to sell. 
 
If the total number of units that participants offer to buy equals the total number of units 
that participants offer to sell, then the period is over and the offers placed by each 
participant at this price level are transacted.  Each participant records the number of units 
that they bought (sold) and their earnings for the period. 
 
Manual Conclusion of Period: If the price changes by one franc and remains in a region 
of three francs for four periods in a row (for example, if the price went from 100, to 101, 
back to 100, then back to 101, OR if the price went from 100, to 101, to 102, then back to 
101), then we will conclude the period manually.  The manual period conclusion process 
is as follows: the computer will show a screen announcing the manual conclusion of a 
period.   
 
DO NOT CLICK THE [ENTER] BUTTON UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER 
INSTRUCTS YOU TO DO SO!!! 
 
On your BIDDING SHEET provided, write the price given by the computer for this price 
adjustment iteration and the amount of X that you want to buy OR sell.  Note that if you 
want to sell, the amount written on the BIDDING SHEET cannot be more than your 
available inventory of X.  The experimenter will then collect these sheets and total the 
amount of X that people want to buy and sell.  If these amounts are equal, then the 
transactions will be made according to the bids made.  If the amount offered to buy is 
greater than the amount offered to sell, then the units sold will be randomly allocated to 
the buyers.  If the amount offered to sell is greater than the amount offered to buy, then 
the units bought will be randomly divided among the sellers. Once the allocation is 
determined for the period, the experimenter will return your BIDDING SHEETS back to 
you with the amount assigned to you to buy/sell.  The experimenter will then instruct 
your to click the [ENTER] button to proceed to the bidding screen.  Please enter the 
amount to buy/sell indicated on your BIDDING SHEETS into the computer in order to 
conclude the period. 
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5.  Calculating your earnings 
 
END OF PERIOD CASH = BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH  
 + DIVIDEND PER UNIT  
 x NUMBER OF UNITS HELD AT THE END OF PERIOD  
 + SALES  
 -  EXPENDITURES ON PURCHASES 
 
PERIOD EARNINGS = END OF PERIOD CASH – BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH 
 
Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.  Your earnings for this experiment are 
given by the cash on hand at the end of period 15.   
 
Example of period earnings. Suppose that in period 10 your BEGINNING OF PERIOD 
CASH is 3,000 francs and your INVENTORY at the beginning of period 10 is 7 units of 
X.  If in period 10 you sell 2 units of X at a price of 200 francs and the dividend draw 
is 8 francs, then in period 10: 
 
SALES= 2*200=400 
 
INVENTORY (at the end of period 10) = 7- 2 = 5 
 
PERIOD DIVIDEND EARNINGS = DIVIDEND PER UNIT * NUMBER OF UNITS IN 
INVENTORY = 8 * 5 = 40. 
 
END OF PERIOD CASH = 3,000 +40+ 2*200 = 3,440 
 
PERIOD EARNINGS = END OF PERIOD CASH – BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH = 
3,440 – 3,000 = 440. 
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6. Quiz 
 
Question 1: Suppose that you purchase a unit of X in period 5.   
a. What is the average dividend payment on the unit of X for period 5?  _____ 
b. If you hold that unit of X till the end of the experiment (11 periods including the 
current period), what is the average total dividend paid on the unit of X?  _____ 
c. What is the maximum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the 
experiment (11 periods including the current period)?  _____ 
d. What is the minimum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the 
experiment (11 periods including the current period)?  _____ 
 
Question 2: Suppose that you purchase a unit of X in period 15.   
a. What is the average dividend payment on the unit of X for period 15?  _____ 
b. If you hold that unit of X till the end of the experiment (1 period including the 
current period), what is the average total dividend paid on the unit of X?  _____ 
c. What is the maximum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the 
experiment (1 period including the current period)?  _____ 
d. What is the minimum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the 
experiment (1 period including the current period)?  _____ 
 
Question 3: At the beginning of the period, the computer will announce a randomly 
drawn initial price between 0 and 500 francs.   
 
a. If, at the announced price, the total number of units that participants offer to buy 
is greater than the total number of units that participants offer to sell, then will the 
program increase or decrease the announced price level? _____ 
 
b. If, at the announced price, the total number of units that participants offer to buy 
is less than the total number of units that participants offer to sell, then will the 
program increase or decrease the announced price level? _____ 
 
Question 4: What is the value of the asset after the final dividend payment in period 15? 
______ 
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AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
period 
Number of 
Remaining 
Dividend 
Payments 
* 
Average Dividend 
Value Per Period 
= 
Average Holding Value 
Per Unit of Inventory 
       
15 1 15 * 24 = 360 
15 2 14 * 24 = 336 
15 3 13 * 24 = 312 
15 4 12 * 24 = 288 
15 5 11 * 24 = 264 
15 6 10 * 24 = 240 
15 7 9 * 24 = 216 
15 8 8 * 24 = 192 
15 9 7 * 24 = 168 
15 10 6 * 24 = 144 
15 11 5 * 24 = 120 
15 12 4 * 24 = 96 
15 13 3 * 24 = 72 
15 14 2 * 24 = 48 
15 15 1 * 24 = 24 
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BIDDING SHEET 
 
(1) 
ENTER THE 
PERIOD OF 
MANUAL 
CONCLUSION 
(2) 
ENTER THE  
PRICE GIVEN 
BY 
COMPUTER 
(2) 
CIRCLE 
WHETHER YOU 
WANT TO  BUY 
OR SELL 
(3) 
ENTER NUMBER 
OF UNITS 
WANTED TO  
BUY OR SELL 
(4) 
NUMBER OF 
UNITS 
ALLOCATED  
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
 
  BUY / SELL  
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PERIOD EARNINGS SHEET  
 
 
(1) 
PERIOD 
 
(2) 
BEGINNING 
CASH 
 
(3) 
+SALES 
-PURCHASES 
 
(4) 
INVENTORY AT THE 
END OF PERIOD 
 
(5) 
DIVIDEND 
PER UNIT 
 
(6) 
PERIOD DIVIDEND 
EARNINGS 
 
(7) 
END CASH 
 
(8) 
BEGINNING 
CASH 
 
(9) 
PERIOD 
EARNINGS 
1 10,000      10,000  
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
 
 
